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Abstract
Augmented reality (AR) gained much public
attention since the success of Poke´mon Go in 2016.
Technology companies like Apple or Google are
currently focusing primarily on mobile AR (MAR)
technologies, i.e. applications on mobile devices, like
smartphones or tablets. Associated privacy issues
have to be investigated early to foster market adoption.
This is especially relevant since past research found
several threats associated with the use of smartphone
applications. Thus, we investigate two of the main
privacy risks for MAR application users based on a
sample of 19 of the most downloaded MAR applications
for Android. First, we assess threats arising from
bad privacy policies based on a machine-learning
approach. Second, we investigate which smartphone
data resources are accessed by the MAR applications.
Third, we combine both approaches to evaluate whether
privacy policies cover certain data accesses or not.
We provide theoretical and practical implications and
recommendations based on our results.
1. Introduction
The release of Poke´mon Go in 2016 led to a major
boost in public awareness about augmented reality
(AR) [1, 2]. AR is defined as a system which “[...]
combines real and virtual objects in a real environment;
runs interactively, and in real time; and registers (aligns)
real and virtual objects with each other” [3, p. 34].
The increasing awareness also led to discussions on
privacy issues related to the use of Poke´mon Go [4].
After Apple (ARKit) and Google (ARCore) released
the AR development kits in 2017, the AR features
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started to become better [5] and many new mobile AR
(MAR) applications (apps) diffused into the consumer
market since then. Nowadays, the majority of people
experience AR mainly by interacting with MAR apps
on their regular mobile devices since AR glasses like
the Microsoft Hololens [6] are not mature enough and
too expensive for the mass market. Thus, MAR apps
shape the perceptions of millions of users about AR.
These perceptions can also be influenced by privacy
concerns and threats [7]. Thus, it is necessary to
investigate privacy issues for new technologies when
they diffuse into the market. However, AR is not widely
investigated in the information systems (IS) domain [8].
Previous studies on MAR applications show that privacy
concerns are prevalent among the users [9]. In addition,
past analyses on smartphone application behaviors show
accesses on a diversity of personal information stored
in the mobile devices [10, 11]. Furthermore, literature
indicates that privacy policies of apps are difficult to
understand by regular users [12] which can lead to a loss
of trust and a decreasing probability of acceptance [13].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
research which combines these aspects and investigates
potential privacy issues arising from the privacy policies
and the resource access behaviors of MAR apps. Thus,
we address the following research questions:
1. Are the data processing practices stated in the
privacy policies of the selected MAR applications
beneficial for the user’s privacy?
2. What resources of the mobile device are accessed
by the MAR applications and are these accesses
privacy-invasive or relevant to the proper
functionality of such applications?
3. Do the selected MAR applications access
resources according to the theoretical behavior
stated in the associated privacy policies?
We base our analysis on 19 of the most prominent
MAR applications (with respect to downloads) from
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the Google Play Store. We analyze the privacy
policies with a machine-learning based tool according to
eleven aspects of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GPDR). The resource accesses of the MAR
apps are assessed by installing a monitoring app on an
Android smartphone. In a final step, we synthesize
the results by comparing the resource accesses with the
statements of the privacy policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Related work is presented in Section 2. The
methodology is described in Section 3 and the results
are presented in Section 4. We conclude by discussing
the results and implications of our work in Section 5.
2. Related Work
The related work section is structured in three parts.
First, we present the related work on the intersection of
AR, especially MAR, and privacy. Since we use two
different methods to assess possible privacy issues of
MAR applications, we summarize current research on
privacy policies and the investigated privacy issues as
well as related research on the analysis of the privacy
behavior of smartphone apps.
2.1. Privacy in (mobile) augmented reality
Since AR and privacy are investigated in different
disciplines, we searched for articles about privacy issues
in MAR in the IS domain, in the specific domain
dealing with mixed and augmented reality and in the
human-computer interaction (HCI) domain.
Research on privacy is a widely investigated topic in
the IS domain [14]. However, privacy topics associated
with AR technologies are not investigated in the IS
domain up to now [8]. There are several articles on
technology acceptance of AR technologies (e.g. [15,
16]) and brief essays on possible privacy issues related
to AR (e.g. [17, 18]). However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no empirical research in the IS
domain aiming at the intersection of AR and privacy.
Dey et al. [19, 20] conduct a literature review on
past user studies on AR. Their results show an increase
in user-focused studies (e.g. [21, 22]). However, to the
best of our knowledge, there are also no specific articles
dealing with privacy issues of AR technologies.
The search in the HCI discipline shows that there is
research which considers privacy aspects. For example,
Koelle et al. [23] find, that the use of data glasses
can be perceived as privacy-invasive. This especially
holds for possible bystanders around the user of the AR
technology. Similar results are found by Denning et
al. [24], whereas the authors only focus on bystanders
around AR devices. Both studies investigate data
glasses as a type of AR technology. In summary,
it can be seen that there is a gap with respect to
privacy and AR technologies. This is especially true
for MAR technologies since these are less investigated
in the literature. The practical importance of privacy
research on MAR apps is given due to the relatively
large diffusion into the mass market compared to other
AR technology types. This is underpinned by the
current efforts of large technology companies like Apple
or Google to establish the best AR features in their
operating systems and associated mobile devices [5].
2.2. Privacy Policy Analyses
Costante et al. [25] proposed a method for evaluating
the completeness of privacy policies, using Natural
Language Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning
(ML) techniques, where a privacy policy is said to be
complete if it contains descriptions which should be
explained in privacy policies, such as how to deal with
cookies. Similarly, Guntamukkala et al. [26] proposed
a method for evaluating the completeness of privacy
policies mainly following a new evaluation criteria
called goal-based approach. Terms of Service: Didn’t
Read (ToS:DR) is a community based project which
valuates privacy policies by crowd-sourcing, and also
provides an add-on for a browser [27]. Zimmeck et
al. [28] use results of ToS:DR to derive privacy aspects
and develop Privee, a machine learning and NLP based
tool. Kelley et al. [29] and Gluck et al. [30] show that the
use of condensed and standardized privacy notices has a
positive effect on user’s awareness of privacy practices.
2.3. Smartphone application behavior analysis
Agarwal et al. [31] introduce the ProtectMyPrivacy
system for iOS which exposes accesses to sensitive
resources by mobile apps. Based on this, users can
decide to anonymize private information and share
these decisions with others. Thus, a crowdsourced
recommendation engine is designed to recommend
privacy settings to the users. Enck et al. [32] investigate
the privacy of smartphone apps in a different way.
Instead of looking at single permissions individually,
they suggest to monitor a set of sensitive permissions,
e.g. location, gallery, contacts, phone number,
etc. In a sample of 311 of the most popular apps
downloaded from Google Play, they find five apps
that implement dangerous functionalities and therefore
should be installed with extreme caution. Followed by
this study, Enck et al. [33] aim to better understand the
security in smartphone apps by proposing a decompiler
which recovers Android apps source code directly from
its installation image. They analyze 21 million lines of
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recovered code from 1,100 free apps using automated
tests and manual inspection and it shows the use/misuse
of personal/phone identifiers, and deep penetration of
advertising and analytics networks.
TaintDroid [34] is a method in which the behavior of
30 popular Android apps is studied. The analyses shows
that two-third of the apps show suspicious handling
of sensitive data and that 15 of them reported users’
location to remote advertising servers. Styx [35] is
the name of a conceptual model which is based on
TaintDroid. Styx is aimed to efficiently communicate
the privacy impacts of smartphone apps to its users.
Results of a user study indicate that Styx is able
to increase user trust into smartphone platforms and
also reduce privacy concerns through communicating
efficient privacy warnings. Similar to our approach,
Kununka et al. [36] compare actual data practices
with the privacy policies. They find that there is a
potential personal data disclosure to third-parties by
app providers which is not stated in the respective
privacy policy. However, in contrast to our study, they
analyze a relatively small set of the potential data on
the smartphone which is disclosed to third parties. The
information on the data disclosure to third-parties is
taken from another paper by Zang et al. [37] who follow
a man-in-the-middle approach to gather the connections
between apps and external servers. In contrast, by
installing the monitoring tool and the smartphone itself
(cf. Section 3.3) we are able to gather more granular
information of resource accesses (cf. Table 2).
3. Methodology
The methodology is based on two pillars which rest
on already developed and tested tools to analyze privacy
policies [38, 39] and app resource access behaviors [?].
The contribution of this paper is the synthesis of both
approaches and the app to MAR apps. Thus, the
methodology has three concrete steps of analyses (cf.
Figure 1). First, we analyze the privacy policies for
every app in our sample based on a machine-learning
approach (Sections 3.2). Since policies only provide
a theoretical statement on what apps and the providers
do with the user data, we analyze the actual MAR app
behavior in a second step (Section 3.3). Finally, we
synthesize the results by comparing the app behavior
with the statements in the respective privacy policies.
3.1. MAR application selection
We analyzed a total of 19 MAR apps (see Table 3
for the details of app names and IDs). We focus
on Android MAR apps running only with ARCore
from the German Google Play Store. We implemented
Figure 1. Overview of the methodology
the privacy behavior analysis tool for Android devices
because of two reasons. First, Android dominates the
market share with a share of 85.1% (2017) and the
number of available Android apps on the Google Play
Store recently was placed at 3.8 million apps [40, 41].
Second, according to recent observations, Android is
the most vulnerable operating system in the world
with 841 vulnerabilities that enable unauthorized parties
to gain access to the sensitive device resources [42].
Accordingly, we were interested to mainly focus on
this operating system. The apps were selected based
on a current study on the most downloaded MAR apps
in the Apple App Store [43]. We had to transfer the
results from this study since there is, to the best of
our knowledge, no comparable estimation available for
Android at the moment. Since we did not want to only
focus on free apps, we also included six apps with a
single payment pricing scheme. Most of the selected
apps (eleven out of 19) are games.
3.2. Privacy policy analysis of MAR
applications
Privacy policies serve as the binding contractual
agreements between users and service providers [44],
i.e., MAR app service providers in our specific scenario.
Privacy policies are also the defacto transparency boards
where MAR app service providers communicate their
data processing practices to their users. However,
numerous studies show that users rarely read these
documents owing to their natural technicality and
excessive length that makes them difficult to be
comprehended by ordinary users [12, 45, 46]. To
address this pertinent challenge, we proposed an
automatic machine learning based tool, PrivacyGuide,
in our previous works [38, 39]. The objective
of PrivacyGuide is to summarize lengthy privacy
policy documents and present them in condensed and
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easy to understand notes. We refer the reader to
these two papers for in depth insights about the
the tool. PrivacyGuide considers eleven aspects for
the privacy policy analysis which are defined taking
the European Union (EU) General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) into account. These aspects include
data collection, security, control, aggregation, deletion,
retention, breach notification, protection of children
data, third party sharing, privacy policy changes, and
settings. However, despite the fact that the GPDR
now clearly mentions the privacy breach notification
as responsibility for the service provider, none of the
privacy policy we analyzed have any mention about
notification plans. In order to draw the attention of
users, PrivacyGuide takes a risk based approach to the
analysis of the privacy policy documents. It considers
a three scale risk analysis where green represents good
data processing practices (explicit statements on the
collected data types or a collection of a small set of
data types), while red shows the opposite (either no
information about what is being collected or a collection
of a large amount of data), and yellow indicates a
scale in between these two. The privacy policies were
analyzed before and after the official application date
of the GDPR on May 25, 2018. By that, we wanted
to assess to what extent the app providers changed
their policies for European users. Eight app providers
changed their policy for the GDPR. The results for
the machine-learning policy analysis improved from a
privacy point of view. Due to space limitations, we will
only report the detailed results for every MAR app for
the time after May 25, 2018 since these are the ones that
should still be valid for future comparisons of this work.
3.3. Privacy behavior analysis of MAR
applications
In order to analyze the privacy behavior of MAR
apps, we used a tool called Android Apps Behavior
Analyzer (A3), which was developed and tested in
an earlier work of the authors [47, 48]. A3 is
solely designed and implemented for Android devices.
Technically it benefits from two main components,
namely log reader and data mining components. The
log reader component is responsible to read the logs
produced by the users device. This includes all the
resource accesses by the installed apps (e.g. access
to sensitive resources like CAMERA, READ CONTACTS,
LOCATION, etc.). Additionally, the app records
timestamps and the total number of resource accesses.
The data produced by this component is processed and
fed into the data mining component. This component
is a rule-based engine that comprises several rules to
identify potential privacy invasive activities by the users
installed apps. We installed the A3 tool on a Samsung
Galaxy S8+ with the OS Android 7.0. At the time of our
experiment, ARCore version 1.2 was not yet published.
Thus, the results only hold for the previous version.
To analyze the privacy behavior of our selected MAR
apps, we conducted the experiment in two phases, while
the A3 tool was running in the background the whole
time (i.e. it was monitoring the privacy behavior of
MAR apps). In the first phase (ranging from May 14 to
May 18), we interacted actively with the mobile device
and used the MAR apps on a daily basis. We ran the
MAR apps once and let them to be executed in the
background during the second phase (ranging from May
18 to May 21). Thus, we never interacted with the
mobile device during this time.
4. Results
In this section, we present the results for the privacy
policy and privacy behaviour analysis as well as the
synthesis of both analyses.
4.1. Results of the privacy policy analysis
The outcomes of the risk-based analysis are shown
in Table 4. We analyze the outcomes for each app and
aspect and build the sums over the different aspects per
app as well as over the different apps per aspect.
The privacy policies of the selected MAR apps
indicate that the app providers have bad data processing
practices (100 out of 190 outcomes are red). This
is especially true for the information about protection
of children, third-party sharing, data retention, control
of data, privacy settings and account deletion.
Furthermore, there are eight apps with more than 5
outcomes that are analyzed as red.
4.2. Results of the privacy behavior analysis
In total, seven sensitive resources were accessed by
the MAR apps (Table 1)1. The results of the analysis for
every app and resource are shown in Table 2. Each cell
contains the results for the active and passive phase.
There is a significant decrease in the number of
resources accesses from the active phase 1 to the passive
phase 2. In general, we would assume that the resource
accesses decrease to zero during the passive phase since
there is no interaction with the apps and the smartphone
itself. However, this is not the case in our study. Thus,
we marked every privacy deviated behavior or privacy
misbehavior of the app in bold face if the app:
1https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview
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Table 1. Identified permissions accessed by
examined MAR apps.
Permission Description
READ STORAGE Allows an app to read from
external storage.
CAMERA Required to be able to access
the camera device.
BODY SENSOR Allows an app to access data
from sensors that the user uses
to measure what is happening
inside his/her body, such as
heart rate.
READ CONTACTS Allows an app to read the user’s
contacts data.
LOCATION Allows an app to access
location.
PHONE STATE Allows an app to access the
phone state, including phone
number of the device, current
cellular network information,
the status of any ongoing calls,
the list of any phone accounts
registered on the device and a
verification of the user/phone
with IMEI information
RECORD AUDIO Allows an app to record audio.
• accessed resources besides the storage during the
passive phase, or
• accessed resources in the active phase which are
not required for the app use.
We define a required resource for the app use as an
obvious and ease to understand need of the app to
function properly. For example, a location-based app
necessarily needs access to the location. Another
example in our sample is app 9 (Insight Heart) and one
access to the body sensor. Since this MAR app has the
feature of synchronizing the user’s own heartbeat with
the digital heart, we assume that this app accessed the
body sensor once during the first start of the app.
According to the definition of privacy misbehavior,
we discuss the results in bold face for every resource
type. The storage accesses are not surprising during the
two phases since the phone was not completely turned
off. However, three apps accessed the camera twice in
the passive phase (app 4, 6 and 14). These accesses
are privacy-invasive, since the user does not know that
the app currently accesses the camera. Contacts were
accessed by app 13 during the active phase. In general,
such accesses to the contacts should not be done by apps.
In this case the app is a game (Monster Park AR), where
it is not clear why it needs access to the user’s contacts.
Thus it is important to assess the privacy policy of the
app to assess to what extent this information is needed.
As discussed earlier, accesses to the location must not
be a problem for the user’s privacy in general. However,
app 11 accesses the location 21 times in the active phase
and 4 times in the passive phase. This is problematic
from a privacy point of view in both phases since the
app is not a location-based and, therefore, does not need
the location information to function.
The phone state is an interesting data resource since
the respective information is highly privacy sensitive.
This permission enables an invasive party to gain access
to sensitive resources such as phone number, cellular
network information, outgoing call information, etc.
Most of the accesses to this resource happened mainly
during the active phase (except for app 1 which also
accessed this resource twice in the passive phase). The
only relevant reason to access this permission is to stop
the app when there is an ongoing call, however, we did
not use any SIM card on the device, therefore, there is
no obvious reason of such resource access. Thus, several
MAR apps behave not privacy-friendly in this resource
category. The last resource which was accessed by two
apps is the recording of audio data. We did not see
any feature needing access to the microphone when we
interacted with both apps. Thus, these accesses can be
seen as not privacy-friendly.
In summary, eleven apps misbehaved with respect to
the user’s privacy (gray rows). In a next step, we assess
whether the accesses marked as not privacy-friendly in
this section are stated in the associated privacy policies.
4.3. Synthesis of the analyses
The privacy policy of the first app states that the
phone number may be collected. This corresponds to
the identified accesses of the phone state. However,
there is no information provided on why this data is
needed other than ”Personal information identifies you
and may be used to contact you online or offline”. Since
an access to the phone state makes it possible to collect
all the information defined in Table 1, it is necessary
to specifically state which types of information are
gathered and how they are used. This result is in
line with the machine-learning based policy analysis
in Table 4. The data collection practices are yellow,
indicating that the policy contains ambiguous or unclear
statements about the collected data. The same holds
for the second app, whereas there were less accesses to
the phone state in the active phase and no access in the
passive phase. The privacy policy is also mentioning the
phone number as a type of collected data.
The behavior of app 6 accessing the camera twice in
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Table 2. MAR application behaviors (active phase versus inactive phase)
Resource Accesses Phase 1 – Phase 2
App # READ
STORAGE
CAMERA BODY
SENSOR
READ
CONTACTS
LOCATION PHONE
STATE
RECORD
AUDIO
1 17 – 2 18 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 12 – 2 0 – 0
2 18 – 6 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 2 – 0 0 – 0
3 14 – 4 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
4 10 – 1 10 – 2 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 3 – 0 0 – 0
5 17 – 2 14 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
6 10 – 11 11 – 2 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
7 12 – 8 14 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 3 – 0 0 – 0
8 11 – 4 8 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 9 – 0 0 – 0
9 7 – 11 10 – 0 1 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
10 10 – 3 8 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
11 19 – 11 12 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 21 – 4 0 – 0 0 – 0
12 8 – 10 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
13 13 – 9 14 – 0 0 – 0 3 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 4 – 0
14 8 – 5 6 – 2 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 2 – 0 0 – 0
15 15 – 3 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
16 7 – 7 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
17 9 – 3 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0
18 11 – 8 12 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 1 – 0
19 14 – 6 10 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 9 – 0 0 – 0
the passive phase is not mentioned in the privacy policy.
The same holds app for 4 accessing the camera twice
in the passive phase. The privacy policy does not state
anything on potential camera accesses when the app is
not used. In addition, phone state data were collected
and it is stated in the policy that they may collect data
like device identifiers [or] IP address. However, there
is no explicit information what data is exactly collected
and for what purpose. The PrivacyGuide analyzes the
policy as green with respect to data collection practices.
This might be due to the false positive generalization.
Accesses to the phone state were also exerted by apps 7,
8 and 19 during the active phase. The privacy policy of
app 7 explicitly states the need to access the phone state
for ad services or Inapp services whereas it is unclear
which specific types of information are processed. The
policy of app 19 is more specific with respect to phone
state associated information by stating to collect, among
others, identifiers such as IP address, device identifiers
[or] ad identifiers. As for previous apps, it is also
not listed which specific data types are processed. In
contrast to apps 7 and 19, app 8 does not state anything
about collecting phone state related data.
App 11 accessed the location data several times
during the active phase and even during the passive
phase. The privacy policy states a possible collection
of broad geographic location (e.g. country or city-level
location) data. However, this is only stated for the case
of When you visit our Sites [i.e. the MAR app], we
may collect certain information automatically from your
device. Thus, the accesses to the location in the passive
phase are not explained by the privacy policy.
Both, accesses to the contacts as well as the audio
resources are not described in the privacy policy of app
13. The same holds for the accessed audio resource by
app 18. The privacy policy does not mention the use
of audio data at all. A special case is app 14 (Porsche
Mission E). Here, the link to the privacy policy in the
Google Play Store only leads to a legal notice. This is
quite puzzling since there should be a policy available
for the users of this app. The necessity for a privacy
policy is underpinned by the privacy-invasive accesses
to the camera in the passive phase and the phone state.
When comparing the results of the machine-learning
based privacy policy analysis for app 14 with the fact
that there is no policy, it becomes obvious that the tool
produced a false positive for the aspect data aggregation
(the accuracy for the risk analysis is 90% [39]).
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our results indicate that there is a privacy risk
associated with the majority of the most famous Android
MAR apps. This risk arises due to bad data processing
practices stated in the privacy policies and privacy
misbehaviors of the applications. Our results show
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several accesses to highly sensitive information like the
contacts, the microphone, the location or the phone
state. In addition, several resources were accessed
during the passive phase, in which the smartphone was
not used actively. None of the resource accesses in
the passive state are explained by the privacy policies.
Several accesses in the active phase (e.g. of contacts
or audio) are also not explained. Thus, the user is
exposed to undisclosed privacy risks. This is important
to notice when discussing user behavior with respect
to privacy and as well as the necessity of regulations
(e.g. the GDPR). Against this backdrop, models on
privacy related behavior of users are problematic and
regulations become necessary when users do not have
the chance to get correct and full information about data
collection and disclosure of applications (shown by the
gap between app behaviors and privacy policies).
Thus, we argue that MAR developers should
carefully investigate the required permissions by their
apps. Our study confirmed that over-privileged MAR
apps (apps with unnecessary and aggressive access to
sensitive resources) are an issue which needs to be
addressed. We also highlight that MAR app privacy
policies need to be severely revisited by their developers.
We also recommend the MAR developers to revise their
privacy policies with respect to unrelated content. We
observed that there is a significant number of privacy
policies that do not focus on the application itself, but
the developer’s webpage, the services offered/provided
by the developers and other unrelated content to the
app’s privacy practices. These steps are necessary to
protect the user’s right for privacy during the use of
MAR apps. In addition, this is necessary for a wider
acceptance of this relatively new technology. Previous
studies show that privacy concerns can have a direct or
indirect negative impact on the adoption and use of new
technologies and services [49, 7].
At the time of our study, the number of available
Android MAR apps was rather small, especially since
we aimed to consider apps with high download numbers.
Since we expect a continuing increase in available MAR
apps, future work should consider to increase the sample
size and investigate more MAR applications. Our work
contributes to the literature by filling the gap between
MAR and privacy. Furthermore, studies like ours can
help to improve the users privacy by creating awareness
and an advanced understanding about privacy threats.
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A. MAR application information and privacy policy analysis results
Table 3. Google Play Store ID, Privacy Policy URL and Pricing Scheme of the MAR Applications
MAR Application Name Google Play Store Link Privacy Policy URL Pricing
1) AMON id=com.lykkestudios.amon https://www.lykkestudios.com/privacy/ e2.99
2) ARise id=com.ClimaxStudios.Aris http://www.climaxstudios.com/privacy-policy/ e3.29
3) Army of Robots id=com.sinergiastudios.armyofrobots http://sinergiastudios.com/EULA/
ArmyOfRobots/terms-en.html
free
4) CamToPlan id=com.tasmanic.camtoplan http://misc.tasmanic.com/camtoplanpolicy.html e3.99
5) Capsule Commander AR id=com.Duncan.CCAR https://sites.google.com/view/ccprivacypol/home free
6) Doll House Decoration - AR id=com.unitm.android.dollhousedecorationar http://unitmgames.com/Privacy-Policy.html
7) Froggie Jump id=com.CendaGames.FroggieJumpFree http://cenda.cz/privacy.html free
8) IKEA Place id=com.inter ikea.place http://www.ikea-place.com/privacy-policy/ free
9) Insight Heart id=com.animares.heart https://animares.com/privacy-policy e2.29
10) Jenga AR id=com.freerangegames.jengaar http://freerangegames.com/privacypolicy/ free
11) Knightfall AR id=com.aetn.games.android.history.knightfall.ar http://www.aenetworks.com/privacy free
12) Mind Map AR, Augmented
Reality ARCore Mind Mapping
id=com.scapehop.mindmapar https://www.iubenda.com/privacy-policy/8170925 free
13) Monster Park AR - Dinosaurier
AR: Jurassic Welt
id=com.vitotechnology.DinoAR http://vitotechnology.com/privacy-policy.html free
14) Porsche Mission E id=com.porsche.missionear https://www.porsche.com/international/legal-notice/ free
15) Slingshot Island id=com.socketheadgames.slingshotisland http://www.socketheadgames.com/Privacy-Policy e0.99
16) Solar System AR (ARCore) id=com.guidapasquale.solarsystemar https://guidapasquale.wordpress.com/privacy-info/ free
17) The Machines id=com.directivegames.themachines.android http://directivegames.com/privacypolicy.html e4.69
18) World of Tanks AR Experience id=net.wargaming.wot.ar http://legal.eu.wargaming.net/de/
datenschutz-und-cookie-richtlinie/
free
19) Zombie Gunship Revenant AR id=com.limbic.revenant https://www.limbic.com/privacypolicy/ free
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Table 4. Privacy Policy Analysis Results (after May 25, 2018)
Privacy Aspects of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Sums
App # Data
Collection
Protection
of children
Third-Party
sharing
Data
security
Data
retention
Data
aggregation
Control
of Data
Privacy
settings
Account
deletion
Policy
changes
∑
G
∑
Y
∑
R
1 yellow green red green green yellow green red red yellow 4 3 3
2 yellow red red green red yellow yellow red red green 2 3 5
3 green green red green yellow yellow red red green green 5 2 3
4 green red red red red yellow red yellow red yellow 1 3 6
5 red red red red red green red red red red 1 0 9
6 red green red red red green red red red red 2 0 8
7 red red red red red yellow red red red red 0 1 9
8 yellow red yellow green yellow green green red red red 3 3 4
9 red red red red red green red red red green 2 0 8
10 green green red green red yellow green green green yellow 6 2 2
11 yellow green red green yellow red green green green green 6 2 2
12 green red red green yellow green red red green yellow 4 2 4
13 yellow green red green red yellow red yellow red green 3 3 4
14 red red red red red green red red red red 1 0 9
15 red red red red red green red red red red 1 0 9
16 yellow green red green red green red red red yellow 3 2 5
17 yellow red red green yellow red green green green green 5 2 3
18 yellow red red red yellow green red red green red 2 2 6
19 yellow green red green yellow yellow green yellow green yellow 4 5 1∑
Green 4 8 0 11 1 9 6 3 7 6 55∑
Y ellow 9 0 1 0 7 8 1 3 0 6 35∑
Red 6 11 18 8 11 2 12 13 12 7 100
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